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AMMUNITION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Libya. Source Threat Resolution Ltd.

AMMUNITION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

PREVENTING LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY, AND DIVERSION FROM STOCKPILES
By Samuel Paunila, Advisor for Ammunition Operations, GICHD and
Andrew Hoole, Ammunition Safety Management consultant, GICHD

T

he international community has been actively
engaged in mine action for over 20 years.
Clearance has been remarkably successful both
in reclaiming land and making life safer for some
of the most disadvantaged people in the world.
As the number of casualties due to landmines has
fallen, we have seen the number of deaths and
injuries caused by explosions in ammunition storage
areas rise1 and an increasing diversion of
ammunition away from state stockpiles and into the
hands of non-state actors; the collapse of Libya in
2011 for instance saw the loss of almost an entire
state stockpile.
86 COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2015/16

Poorly managed stockpiles of ammunition present
two distinct threats to the wider community: the risk
of an explosion within the stockpile and the risk of
diversion. Explosions in ammunition storage areas are
being reported at 2 per month worldwide2. This figure
is based on reported incidents and the real number
may be significantly higher. The effects of explosions
in ammunition storage areas can be truly devastating
with damage to property and infrastructure running in
to billions of dollars3 and a human cost measured in
shattered lives4.
Diversion could be described as a theft, or loss of
ammunition that reduces the capability of the stockpile
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Lapua ammunition factory accident aftermath, Finland 1976.
owner, usually the state, and allows military grade
ammunition and explosives to be used by non-state
actors. Military ammunition is in many countries the
preferred main charge for use in improvised explosive
devices (IEDs).
There are numerous issues to consider and
procedures to follow when managing ammunition
stockpiles, like any risk management strategies they
are designed to reduce the likelihood of an accident
and/or to reduce the consequences of such event.
There are many factors that increase the risk of an
explosion and they all need to be addressed. As a
primary measure where ammunition is safe to move
and where the situation allows, it should be moved
away from people and vital infrastructure as soon as
reasonably practicable. In the event of an ammunition
storage explosion, this simple logistics activity will
mitigate much of the potentially devastating effects.
Ammunition Safety Management is a broad subject
and for brevity and readability we will focus on some of
the major contributing factors to the explosive risk. The
first three are broadly risk mitigation and the remaining
four deal with accident prevention.

• Stockpiled ammunition in or near populated centres.
• Quantity Distances and SOPs.
• Segregation of ammunition in storage by Hazard
Divisions and Compatibility Groups.
• Segregation
between
serviceable
and
unserviceable ammunition.
• Unsafe and shelf life expired ammunition within the
stockpile.
• Untrained and unsupervised personnel.
• Poor inventory control measures and lack of basic
management.
Each of these factors represents a significant
management challenge, which is still poorly understood
by many states. Some of these challenges tie
together and can be improved significantly with small
investments into human and technical resources. It is
the planning and prioritisation of ammunition safety
management that is key to improving the situation
and managing the explosive risk. We will now briefly
introduce the above factors.
Stockpiled ammunition in populated areas.
Moving the ammunition away from people, property
counteriedreport.com
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Libyan market for munitions. Source James Madison University.
and infrastructure is paramount. In order to accomplish
Segregation of ammunition. Ammunition can
this safely the ammunition must be inspected before
be classified generically into Hazard Divisions (HD)
transport and certified as ‘safe to move’. Ammunition
by the major hazard that it poses in the event of an
that is not ‘safe to move’ must be destroyed in
accident, be it mass explosion, fragmentation or a fire
accordance with EOD drills and
hazard. Within each HD the
principles.
ammunition is sub-divided into
... THE ADOPTION OF THE
Quantity Distances. One of
Compatibility Groups (CG) to
QUANTITY DISTANCES WILL determine which items can be
the easiest, cheapest and most
ENSURE THAT IF AN
effective means of protecting
stored and transported together.
public and property from the EXPLOSION OCCURS THE RISK By adhering to HD, CG and
effects of an explosion is by the
approved mixing rules we can
TO THE PUBLIC IS REDUCED TO radically reduce the risk of an
use of separation distances.
A TOLERABLE LEVEL …
Quantity Distance (QD) tables
ammunition accident and lessen
are available that give minimum
the effects should one occur.
acceptable separation distance from a given quantity
Separation of serviceable and unserviceable
and type of ammunition to areas where the public may
ammunition. Unserviceable does not automatically
live, congregate, work or transit. Within the storage
mean unsafe. The term ‘unserviceable’ covers
areas there should also be separation between
a broad spectrum of ammunition from an item
storage locations to reduce the risk of an explosion
so unsafe it has to be destroyed in situ, through
propagating from one store to another. The adoption
to ammunition that is apparently perfect in all
of, and adherence to, these QD will ensure that if an
respects but fails to meet the specified performance
explosion occurs it will be limited to one location and
parameters. Mixing the two categories will have
the risk to the public is reduced to a tolerable level.
implications such as decreasing war fighting capability
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US Soldier in underground storage bunker near Tikrit, Iraq, 1st Sep 2003. Source NBC News.
and risking the safety of the entire stockpile, including
all serviceable ammunition.
Unsafe and life expired stocks being retained.

main charge in IEDs. Diversion may be small-scale
and local, or large with national or even regional
dimensions.

The safety of ammunition is not always immediately
apparent and as ammunition degrades over time it
may become unstable, increasing the likelihood of
initiation in storage or whilst being moved. If stored
with serviceable ammunition there is an increased risk
of losing strategic stocks.
Untrained personnel.
Ammunition requires
special handling and storage requirements.
All
personnel working with ammunition must be aware of
the risks and the associated safety precautions and
procedures. Addressing these factors will reduce the
risk of an ammunition accident occurring and limit the
amount of ammunition involved as well as minimising
the impact on people and property.
The other major risk posed by ammunition
stockpiles is diversion. Ammunition is a sought
after commodity and in many countries the favoured

Small-scale diversion is characteristically carried
out by individuals or small groups. It may be a
member of the security forces or an authorised worker
with access to ammunition taking directly from the
stockpile. This kind of theft typically takes place where
security is lax, accounting procedures are inadequate
and where there is poor supervision over the site
and workforce. To counter diversion at this level the
ammunition must be physically secured, access
restricted and monitored, and the ammunition subject
to strict accounting, regular stock checks and a clear
audit trail.
Examples of large-scale diversion include the
former Soviet Union countries and more recently Iraq
and Libya. Where accounting and accountability break
down, diversion at grand scale may flourish. Without
attempting to over-simplify the problem, the actions
counteriedreport.com
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required to address the diversion and proliferation of
ammunition in grand scale are essentially the same
in terms of restricting access, establishing accurate
accounts and instilling accountability.
Further means of diversion include forced theft,
mass looting or abandonment. At grassroots this might
be an armed gang breaking in to an explosive store and
stealing the ammunition; whilst at the larger scale, with
a shifting frontline in a conflict area, the ammunition
stockpile could be lost entirely. The need for physical
security and an adequate security response at the
lower level is a fundamental part of ammunition safety
management. A secure building may not keep out wellequipped and determined attackers but it will slow
them sufficiently for a co-ordinated security response
to be mounted. Secure buildings, adequate monitoring
through CCTV, regular patrols and a dedicated armed
quick response force are the PS (Physical Security)
component of appropriate PSSM. Whilst the loss of
ammunition to wrong hands is more difficult to prevent
in all settings, good management of the ammunition
stockpile should ensure that only tactical, rather than
strategic levels of stock are lost.
Improving ammunition safety and security requires
a change in mindset and a political will. The case is
pertinent in both emerging and developed countries.
Finland makes a good example, having suffered a

in Finland’s manufacturing sites and none in storage
locations, with no casualties or significant damage in

series of ammunition explosions in storage areas
and factories in the 1960s and 1970s5. The accident
investigations pointed out that most of the explosions
could have been avoided and that their impact could
have reduced through implementation of relatively
simple measures. This revelation prompted the
Ministries of Defence and the Interior to reassess and
redefine priorities. National standards for ammunition
management were developed in the late 1970’s and
updated in the 1980’s and 1990’s; training of both
military and civil personnel was carried out; and a staff
screening and qualification regime was established.
Good practice guidance was sought and learnt
from other countries, introduced to the ammunition
industry and armed forces, and then standardised and
monitored. It worked. Since the 1970’s and until early
2015 only two explosive incidents have been recorded

either case.
In Finland today, large ammunition stockpiles have
been reduced in size and explosive depots have
been modernised and life cycle managed, with much
capacity now situated underground, resulting in a safe
and secure system for storing ammunition in significant
quantities. With the project due for completion in
2018, the national effort will continue in neutralising
the remaining explosive remnants (ERW) from World
War II, inspecting and decommissioning expiring
stocks, and procuring new ammunition to maintain the
defence capability.
On the challenge of expired stocks, ammunition is
never completely safe. Explosives are combinations
of chemicals and these react with each other.
Depending on the level of exposure to external
conditions, these chemical processes slow down or
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Albanian ammunition store. Source GICHD.
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determined as well as the anticipated effects
on a type of munition over time due to altered
packaging, temperature and humidity in the
store location.
All this said, in most cases the lead cause
of an explosion in a storage area is remarkably
less technical and subject to external
disturbance. Examples are sub-standard and
old electrical installations, smoking and other
spark-inducing activities, burning rubbish
and packaging material near ammunition, a
fire that started elsewhere and spread to the
ammunition storage area, and so forth.
Ammunition Store in South Sudan, 2014. Source GICHD.
To summarise, there are numerous
instances of continued malpractice in storing
accelerate. Regardless of the design of conventional
ammunition. Ammunition is being stored alongside
ammunition, the means of triggering and initiation
weapons, serviceable and unserviceable ammunition
are simple mechanical-chemical or electric-chemical
is being stored together and Hazard Classification
systems. By neglecting
Codes are being ignored.
the basic requirements for
Abandoned and unexploded
BY NEGLECTING THE BASIC
storekeeping, it is entirely
ordnance and quarrying
probable, and this likelihood
REQUIREMENTS FOR STOREKEEPING, explosives and accessories
increases over time, that
are in some places mixed in
badly kept ammunition will IT IS ENTIRELY PROBABLE THAT BADLY with the operational stock.
accidentally initiate one
KEPT AMMUNITION WILL ACCIDENTALLY Some armed forces continue
day, will fail to function as
to stockpile ammunition that
EXPLODE ONE DAY, WILL FAIL TO
designed or will be stolen or
has no corresponding, or
be traded away. In addition,
functioning weapon system
FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, WILL BE
as ammunition gets too old
with which to fire it. These
STOLEN, OR THEN BE TRADED AWAY are not only bad practices,
and unstable it will prove
more expensive to destroy
but, as history has shown
as increased care and
us, they are also dangerous.
safety measures have to be applied throughout the
Safe routines, standard operating procedures,
disposal operation.
supervision and discipline are called for.
It is also worth killing a myth in the notion of
There is plenty of technical guidance available.
unpredictability of ammunition. While it is true, that
United Nation’s International Ammunition Technical
it is difficult to know what is going on inside an old
Guidelines (2015) in French and English, UN
artillery shell by simply looking at it, there are ways
Saferguard Web portal (UN ODA), OSCE’s Handbook
to rapidly verify the type of explosive in ammunition
of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2007),
and with some more effort and techniques, to
NATO’s AASTPs6 (2006), and British Joint Service
determine the level of deterioration in its components,
Protocol publications7 (e.g. JSP482) are examples
including the condition of fuze(s). There is no magic
of complementary international guidance on good
in these processes, only science. By studying the
practice. Professional advisory services and training
history of storage, ammunition shelf life can be
are also available to bridge the gap between the
counteriedreport.com
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current state of ammunition affairs, and the minimum
level of acceptable stockpile safety and security.
A properly managed ammunition stockpile has
virtually no obsolete, unserviceable or surplus stock.
It is kept safely away from people, accounted for
correctly with a clear audit trail and stored in a secure
location with regular inspections and stock checks.
It requires trained, qualified and dedicated staff and
a commitment to safety and accountability. With
these people and procedures in place the risks and
impact of ammunition accidents or diversion can be
reduced to a negligible level that should be the goal
of everyone involved in ammunition management. ■
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